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mora, J. J., & muro, J. (2014). informalidad y salarios mínimos por cohorte 
en Colombia. Cuadernos de Economía, 33(63), 469-486.
Este artículo busca analizar el efecto de los niveles del salario mínimo en la deci-
sión de unirse al sector del empleo informal. Estimamos un modelo pseudo panel 
de participación en el sector informal usando un probit-IV. Nuestros resultados 
muestran que la creciente brecha salarial –la diferencia relativa entre el salario 
observado y el salario mínimo– no solo tiene un efecto de desincentivo en la pro-
babilidad de unirse a la informalidad, sino que además lleva a un efecto de sustitu-
ción entre las cohortes más jóvenes y las de mayor edad. 
palabras clave: informalidad, salario mínimo, variable probit, modelo pseudo 
panel, sesgo de selección.
Jel: c35, j32.
mora, J. J., & muro, J. (2014). informalité et salaires minimums par cohorte 
en Colombie. Cuadernos de Economía, 33(63), 469-486.
cet article cherche à analyser l’effet des niveaux du salaire minimum obligatoire 
sur la décision de rejoindre le secteur de l’emploi informel. Nous considérons un 
modèle pseudo-panel de participation dans le secteur informel en utilisant un pro-
bit-IV. Nos résultats montrent que l’augmentation de l’écart salarial —la différence 
relative entre le salaire observé et le salaire minimum— n’a pas seulement un aspect 
démotivant sur la probabilité de rejoindre l’informalité, mais qu’en outre, il porte un 
effet de substitution chez les cohortes plus jeunes et les plus âgées.
mots-clés : Informalité, salaire minimum, variable probit, modèle pseudo-panel, 
biais de sélection.
Jel : c35, j32.
mora, J. J., & muro, J. (2014). informalidade e salários mínimos por coorte 
na Colômbia. Cuadernos de Economía, 33(63), 469-486.
Este artigo busca analisar o efeito dos níveis do salário mínimo na decisão de se 
juntar ao setor do emprego informal. Propomos um modelo pseudo-painel de par-
ticipação no setor informal utilizando um probit-IV. Os nossos resultados mostram 
que a crescente brecha salarial —a diferença relativa entre o salário observado e o 
salário mínimo— não só tem um efeito de desestímulo na probabilidade de se jun-
tar à informalidade, mas que, além do mais, leva a um  efeito de substituição entre 
as coortes mais jovens e as mais velhas. 
palavras-chave: Informalidade, salário mínimo, variável probit, modelo pseudo-
painel, viés de seleção.
Jel: c35, j32.
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introduCtion
The minimum wage in colombia is established through negotiations between rep-
resentatives of the workers’ union and an employers’ association in december 
every year. If they fail to reach an agreement, the government establishes the min-
imum wage. Only in three of the last eight years, has there been an agreement 
between both parties.
The minimum wage is a key element of economic and social policy in develop-
ing countries. The minimum wage affects not only workers in the formal sec-
tor, but also many prices and taxes, which are set based on the minimum wage 
in colombia. For this reason, the policy with respect to the minimum wage is 
significant in colombia where approximately 56 percent of all workers earn the 
minimum wage (Hernández & Pinzón, 2006, p. 12) and 73 percent of all work-
ers affiliated to the social security system earn two or less minimum salaries 
(Arango & Posada, 2007, p. 14).
Furthermore, the minimum wage is the base level for wages in the formal sec-
tor. Although there are different explanations as to what is considered informal 
and formal in the labor market, there seems to be a consensus in terms of con-
sidering the absence of entry barriers a key element in the ease to join the infor-
mal sector. In the formal sector, in contrast, labor laws, company regulations, and 
fixed minimum wages, among others, have become entry barriers. In this context, 
government intervention in the economy via the determination of the minimum 
wage generates incentives to either join or leave the informal sector; for example, 
the minimum wage generates incentives to choose one sector. In this article, we 
assume that those who work in the informal sector have actually chosen to do so. 
compared to other approaches to the problem, this paper differs in several aspects. 
Firstly, our analysis involves a follow-up of the informal sector from 2001 to 2005, 
based on the construction of a pseudo panel. secondly, we discuss the effect of the 
minimum wage on the probability to join the informal sector. With the available 
data, we built six cohorts based on information from 13 metropolitan areas, from 
the june issue of the National Household survey. This procedure provides a sam-
ple of 89,241 individuals for the period under review. As in the standard WgM 
two-sector model (gramlich, 1976; Mincer, 1976; Welch, 1976), a higher mini-
mum wage implies low wages in the uncovered or informal sector because of the 
movements from the formal to the informal sector (Lemos, 2009). In our speci-
fication, these movements are the result of worker transitions from one sector to 
another due to the effect of the minimum wage. This feature is particularly impor-
tant in developing countries where the informality rate is high, and the total effect 
of the minimum wage over informality will depend on the labor force composition 
in the informal sector, i.e., the proportion of younger and older cohorts. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the second section we discuss the literature 
on the effects of the minimum wage on employment in both the formal and infor-
mal sectors. In the third section, we present a model of the engagement in the 
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informal sector and describe the methodology for using pseudo panel data in the 
analysis. In the fourth section, we offer estimates of the model using an instrumen-
tal variable probit in which we take into account a correction for the presence of 
selection bias in pseudo panel data. We conclude in the last section. 
literature reVieW 
The theory suggests that the impact of the minimum wage on the labor market 
depends either on competitive or non-competitive assumptions. In a competitive 
labor market, the minimum wage established above the market equilibrium wage 
results in unemployment. In a monopsonistic labor market, if the minimum wage is 
above the monopsony wage level (but below the competitive level), employment 
will increase.1
A review of the literature on the effect of the minimum wage on unemploy-
ment shows no clear conclusion on the direction of the effect. card and Krueger 
(1994) found that restaurants in New jersey, where the minimum wage was raised, 
expanded the workforce in comparison to restaurants in Pennsylvania. However, 
using different data, Newmark and Washer (1995) found an increase in unemploy-
ment in New jersey. castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992) found that in Puerto 
Rico a 10% increase in the minimum wage caused an employment reduction of 
5%. With respect to the results of castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992), Krueger 
(1995) showed that the results are statistically fragile. bell (1997) found that in 
Mexico, the minimum wage has had no effects on wages in the formal employ-
ment sector, but found substantial unemployment effects associated with the min-
imum wage in colombia. suryahadi, Widyanti, Perwira and sumarto (2003) 
considered the presence of substitution effects: minimum wage decreases employ-
ment of unskilled workers and increase employment of white-collar workers. 
Fields (1994) discussed the effect of minimum wages on multi-sector labor mar-
kets (Fields, 1975, 1994) and found that the effect of an increase of the minimum 
wage in the formal sector on employment is ambiguous. 
In developing countries, Lemos (2007) showed that a higher minimum wage in 
brazil is associated with a reduction of inequality, but not with lower employ-
ment. Lemos (2009) also showed that the employment effects are due to assump-
tions previously made on the existence of a segmented or integrated labor market. 
In colombia, Magnac (1991) provides the first test of informality in colombia. In 
Magnac’s (1991) bivariate probit model, the informal sector is identified with self-
employment (excluding employers). His results reject a segmented labor market 
hypothesis. However, Magnac’s model shows that when an individual chooses to 
1
 Of course, there are other approaches to informality. In particular, The Economic commission 
for Latin America considers the economic structure (cimoli, Primi & Pugno, 2006). Also Fields 
(1994) discussed the hypothesis of segmented labor markets.
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work in the formal sector, the benefits associated with not working are indistin-
guishable from the benefits of working in the informal sector. 
Núñez (2002) suggests that joining the informal sector in colombia is a volun-
tary act of which individuals are aware. Why should one choose one sector or 
another? Núñez (2002) believes that there are several factors that encourage par-
ticipation in the informal business sector since there is a lenient environment 
that facilitates evasion of labor-related taxes. This refers to tax evasion such as 
tax withholding at the source and other state-imposed taxes based on a formal 
employment agreement. However, Núñez (2002) failed to discuss the effects of trun-
cated sampling in his results when calculating the informal participation of individ-
uals who earn more than $1,200,000 colombian pesos. Ribero (2003) and correa, 
Ortiz and Uribe (2006) modeled informal employment as the result of socioeco-
nomic characteristics of an individual, where education has a negative effect on 
the likelihood to enter into the informal sector. depending on the purpose of the 
study, other variables have been included such as age, position in the household, 
non-labor income, gender, and fertility. Ribero (2003) did not make a selection 
bias adjustment, and correa et al. (2006) did not include the selection correction 
in their calculations. 
Hernández and Pinzón (2006) modeled the effect of an increased minimum wage 
on labor participation using pooled data and find that there are substitution effects 
between workers. However, Hernández and Pinzón (2006) did not consider the pseudo 
panel measurement error due to the nature of the colombian data—the official 
information by the colombian department of statistics does not include the pos-
sibility of panel data.2 Finally, Rhenals (2009) discussed the relationship between 
informality and minimum wages in colombia using pictures and tendencies, but 
without any formal specification or estimation. 
model speCiFiCation
In the standard labor force participation model individuals maximize their utility 
over consumption and leisure, subject to budget constraints and the time avail-
able for these activities (deaton & Muellbauer, 1980; gronau, 1973; Killing-
sworth & Heckman, 1986; Mcconnell, brue & MacPherson, 2003; Mora, 2013; 
Pencavel, 1986).
In developing countries, the standard WgM two-sector model (gramlich, 1976; 
Mincer, 1976; Welch, 1976) shows that when a group of workers is outside the 
umbrella of minimum wage legislation, a rise in the minimum wage implies that 
wages in the uncovered sector fall as a result of the displacement of workers in 
2
 There is no consensus on the effect of the minimum wage levels on employment in colombia. 
While Maloney and Núñez (2003) found a negative relationship between minimum wages and 
employment, Robbins (2003) provides evidence on the fact that minimum wages have not had 
such a negative effect. 
474 Cuadernos de Economía, 33(63), julio-diciembre de 2014
the covered sector into the uncovered sector. As a consequence, the wage effect is 
expected to be positive in the covered sector and negative in the uncovered sector 
(Lemos, 2009). 
It seems evident that the prediction of the WgM model implies segmentation in the 
labor market. In colombia, Arango and Posada (2001) suggested the possibility of 
segmentation based on a discussion of the unemployment rate. garcía, Ortiz and 
Uribe (2007) discussed segmentation comparing Mincer regressions for the formal 
and informal sectors, and garcía, Mesa and Roa (2008) also used Mincer regres-
sions, which incorporate differences among cities and sectors. Using Markovian 
chains Mora and Muro (2013) discussed the possibility of a segmented labor mar-
ket and found segmentation in professional workers. Finally, Nupia (1997), jara-
millo, Romero and Nupia (2000) and galvis (2002), using time series, found that 
there is no cointegration among wages, i.e. there is a segmented labor market.
With respect to the results of the WgM model, we suppose that if there are seg-
mented labor markets in a developing country (such as, for example, colombia), 
the impact of an increased minimum wage on labor participation will depend on the 
proportion of younger and older workers in the economy. Thus, we suppose that 
the mobility within sectors with a minimum wage is not perfect because of the 
benefits of the minimum wage. Let us assume that the government imposes a min-
imum wage for the formal sector in the economy. Then, an individual’s decision 
to enter into the informal sector results from comparing the benefits of working in 
the formal sector versus the benefits of working in the informal sector. Now, work 
in the formal sector consists of a standard fixed work time, and the guarantee of 
social security, pension, and health. 
Let us assume that individuals are able to choose whether or not they want to join 
the formal or informal sector based on a set of variables (Fields, 1994; Maloney, 
2004)3. Therefore, engagement in the informal sector can be specified as follows:
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Where Ii(t),t * is a latent variable that represents earnings from working in a given 
sector and Ii(t),t equals one when an individual chooses to work in the informal sec-
3
 This assumption is fundamental because of the characterization of “easy-entry” and “upper-tier” 
informal employment (Kucera & Roncolato, 2008).
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tor or otherwise zero. The “i(t)” subscripts indicate that the observations come 
from representative and independent cross-sections where individuals are only 
available in one period. 
Si(t),t is education level in years. This variable is inversely related with the likeli-
hood to join the informal sector (correa et al., 2006; López, 2010; Magnac, 1991; 
Núñez, 2002; Ribero, 2003). 
MWi(t),t represents the ratio between real observed and real minimum wage by cit-
ies, which decrease the likelihood to enter into the informal sector. In particular, 
we consider the wage gap, the relative difference between observed and minimum 
wage. Fiszbain (1992) shows that reductions of the minimum wage increase the 
employment in the formal sector and reduce the employment in the informal sec-
tor. The negative relationship between the wage gap and employment in the infor-
mal sector is the result of movements of the labor force across sectors and the size 
of unemployment and the new employment in the formal sector.
Cj,i(t) is the dummy for cohortj (J = 1,..,6). Cj,i(t)MWi(t) is the interaction between 
cohortj (J = 1,..,6) and the wage gap. deaton (1985) suggested using cohorts to 
obtain consistent estimators of b when numeric variables are used and adjusting 
the estimator for the presence of measurement errors. Moffitt (1993) proposed an 
IV-probit approach, which, in the case of independent continuous variables sub-
ject to measurement errors, implies using a set of time-invariant variables and a set 
of time-variant variables.
The hi(t) variable represents the deviation of the effect of the cohort after breaking 
down fixed individual effects. Therefore, if there are any fixed individual effects, 
these will be consistent with fixed effects in the cohort. Finally, we include time-
variant variables. since economic growth is a determining factor when setting the 
minimum salary, the gdP lagged by one period is used as time-invariant variable. 
It is also worth noting that binary variables will not be subject to correction (dea-
ton, 1985). 
data
The labor market in colombia experienced an increasing rate of female labor force 
participation from 1981 to 2000. The female labor force participation rose from 37 
percent in 1981 to 51 percent in 1998. Meanwhile, the male labor participation has 
remained stagnant for the last decades, i.e., 74.28 percent in 1981 and 73.98 per-
cent in 1998 (bernat, Ribero & Tenjo, 2004). consequently, the traditional gender 
gap in labor force participation has decreased over the last century. On the other 
hand, there has been an important fall in the unemployment rate in the past few 
years. According to the colombian department of statistics (dANE), unemploy-
ment dropped from 16.6 percent in 2000 to 11.4 percent in 2006. 
In colombia, there are no panel survey statistics on household labor supply data. 
Our sample comes from the National Housing survey (NHS), which consists of a 
time series of independent and representative cross-sections collected from 2001 
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to 2005 by dANE. since 2000, the dANE has collected information about the 
labor market through another statistics survey called the continuous Housing sur-
vey. The dANE measures engagement in the informal sector based on information 
about workers or employers who have less than 10 workers, independent non-pro-
fessional, non-technical workers, housekeepers, and family assistants who do not 
earn monetary compensation. Ribero (2003) proposes four definitions of infor-
mality and shows how the informal sector share changes substantially depending 
on the definition considered. The definitions take into account not only company 
size, but also other criteria such as membership to the social security system, an 
employment agreement, or medical insurance coverage. 
based on dANE’s definition of informality, castillo (2006) estimated the size 
of informality to be 61 percent in 2002 and 59 percent in 2005. However, when 
the definition does not include the headcount size, but the kind of employment 
agreement or memberships, the informal sector share is approximately 30 percent, 
Ribero (2003), whereas Hernández and Pinzón (2006) found that the informal sec-
tor share is about 50 percent based on medical insurance coverage.
In this paper, we define “informal” to refer to anyone who does not have social 
security coverage in health, pensions or formal employment contract. According 
to this definition and using a sample of individuals who were engaged in the labor 
market, we have constructed six cohorts of individuals whose ages range from 18 
to 56 years in the period 2001-2005. Our sample contains 89,241 individuals for 
the observed period. sample means of the selected variables are in the Table 1.
TAbLE 1. 
MEANs OF THE VARIAbLEs
Variable/Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001-2005
Years of education 9.85 9.99 10.17 10.32 10.43 10.15
Inflation (13 
metropolitan areas) 8.35% 6.32% 7.78% 5.99% 5.03% 6.44%
Minimum wage 
(thousand col$) 286 309 332 358 381.5 333.75
Real minimum wage 
(thousand col$) 262.11 289.46 306.16 336.52 362.3 311.79
Informality 44.51% 44.60% 44.74% 43.65% 43.71% 44.26%
Number of individuals 18.136 17.348 17.415 17.444 18.898 89.241
source: Authors’ calculations using The National Housing survey (dANE-EcH). 
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As shown in Table 1 above, the average number of years of education is close to 
10. This number seems to have been stable for the past 10 years. Mora and Muro 
(2008) obtained a similar average for the period 1995-2000 using pseudo panel 
data. Labor income figures were adjusted for inflation in each of the metropolitan 
areas, showing a slight improvement due to the combined effect of the economic 
growth and the fall in inflation. It must also be noted that the real minimum wage 
has been increasing in all metropolitan areas. Finally, there are no substantial dif-
ferences among the number of individuals in the sample every year. To build 
our wage gap variable, we calculated by cohorts and cities the ratio between 
observed wages and real minimum wages by main cities and found an inverted U.
In Figure 1, the ratio increases in cohorts three and four and decreases in five and 
six. Next, we explored participation in the informal labor market and found that 
the informal sector has relative homogeneity by cohorts and regions. The results 
are as follows.
FIgURE 1. 
WAgEs bY cOHORTs
Evolution of Wages in Colombia: 2001-2005
2001
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source: Authors’ calculations using The National Housing survey (dANE-EcH). 
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Figure 2 shows that the youngest cohort has the highest participation in the infor-
mal sector. Medellín is the city with the lowest participation in the informal sector 
rates in each cohort, while cartagena has the lowest participation in the informal 
sector in the fourth cohort throughout the entire period under review.
FIgURE 2.
INFORMAL sEcTOR RATE bY cOHORTs
source: Authors’ calculations using The National Housing survey (dANE-EcH). 
results
The estimates by Núñez (2002); Ribero (2003); correa et al. (2006) of participa-
tion in the informal employment sector were obtained from samples of working 
individuals. Ribero (2003) justifies this selection because there are other models, 
such as those by Ribero and Meza (1997), which specifically analyze labor market 
participation in colombia. correa et al. (2006) did not raise any special consider-
ations with regard to this. The results of the estimation of our model of engage-
ment in the informal sector are discussed below.
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TAbLE 2.
MARgINAL EFFEcTs FOR INFORMAL WORKERs
Variable / model pool-probitb/sd
marginal 
effects iV-probit 
marginal 
effects
Education -0.1220063 -0.0483948 -0.0955948 -0.0379173
(0.0014036) ** (0.0122872) **
gap:(W-Wmin)/
Wmin
-0.156334 -0.0620112 -0.1930817 -0.0765851
(0.0115719)** (0.0192138)**
c1 -0.7490834 0.5502242 -0.7439434 0.536604
(0.0231283)** (0.0231448) **
c2 -0.3820409 0.3242436 -0.3808606 0.3035093
(0.0184387) ** (0.0183905)**
c3 0.0203672 0.0326199 0.0318899 0.0092381
(0.0132721)* (0.0138739)*
c4 -0.1946036 0.0921534 -0.1921517 0.078173
(0.0166463)** (0.0167461)**
c5 -0.1674056 0.0722831 -0.1601081 0.0577017
(0.0167929)** (0.0173337)*
c6 -0.1704153 0.0666029 -0.1646574 0.0573355
(0.0183733)** (0.0186383)**
c1*gap -0.7490834 -0.7439434
(0.0231283)** (0.0231448) **
c2*gap -0.3820409 -0.3808606
(0.0184387) ** (0.0183905)**
c3*gap 0.0203672 0.0318899
(0.0132721)* (0.0138739)*
c4*gap -0.1946036 -0.1921517
(0.0166463)** (0.0167461)**
c5* gap -0.1674056 -0.1601081
(0.0167929)** (0.0173337)*
c6*gap -0.1704153 -0.1646574
(0.0183733)** (0.0186383)**
(Continued)
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TAbLE 2.
MARgINAL EFFEcTs FOR INFORMAL WORKERs
Variable / model pool-probitb/sd
marginal 
effects iV-probit 
marginal 
effects
InvMills -11.33548 -11.19631
(0.2560378)** (0.256311)**
constant 11.97381 11.78705
(0.2485394)** (0.2633142)**
c2 (15) = 31296.96 (44) = 38151
% success 75.75% 76.04%
% success (1) 76.91% 77.82%
% success (0) 74.67% 74.39%
N 89.241 89.241
Note: dummy variables for cities are included in all regressions and standard Errors are 
shown in parenthesis. * p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01.
source: Authors’ calculations using The National Housing survey (dANE-EcH). 
The first column in Table 2 shows estimates from a pooled probit, which are 
obtained from model (1) specification using the entire sample without consider-
ing the existence of a measurement error because of the nature of pseudo panel 
data. The sign of the education level variable is negative and statistically signif-
icant. Each additional year of education raises the probability of working in the 
informal sector by 4.8 percent. The effect of the wage gap (gap variable) is nega-
tive and statistically significant on the probability of joining informality. Our result 
shows that a 1% increase in the gap decreases the probability of engagement in 
the informal sector by 6%. With respect to the cohorts, while the first two cohorts 
have more than 50% probability to be in the informal sector, in the old cohorts, the 
probability is around 6%. 
The instrumental variable probit estimation column, IV-Probit, shows the estimated 
probability to join the informal sector using the pseudo panel technique and robust 
standard errors.4 In the model, we correct for selection biases. As indicated by Ribero 
(2003) and correa et al. (2006), estimates of a model of the engagement in the infor-
mal sector for the entire sample of workers lead to the occurrence of selection biases 
because the unemployment choice is not considered.5 The presence of selection 
4
 The variance-covariance matrix of the IV-probit estimator was corrected using the method pro-
posed by Amemiya (1978). We use all cohorts, one lag for Pib and unemployment rate as instru-
ments (Mora and Muro 2008). 
5
 Although Ribero (2003) and correa et al. (2006) are aware of the problem, Ribero (2003) does not 
consider it. correa et al. (2006) try to avoid it by proposing a multinomial model, which not only 
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bias has been corrected by estimating and incorporating Mills inverse ratio in the 
model. We have estimated the likelihood of participation based on the number of 
working individuals in the cohort following the work of gronau (1974), Lewis 
(1974), Mora and Muro (2012). In particular, Mora and Muro (2012) showed that 
it was possible to correct the existence of selection biases based on a semi-para-
metric test, which involves incorporating Mills inverse ratio. The Mills inverse 
ratio has been computed from the proportion of the labor participating individu-
als in each cohort with respect to the total number of individuals in the cohort. 6 
Our results show that the Mills inverse ratio is negative and statistically significant, 
thus, corroborating the presence of selection bias.
Our results indicate that all coefficients are statistically significant, and the per-
centage of success of the model is above 76 percent. The percentage of the correct 
classification of ones was 77.82 and the percentage of the correct classification of 
zeros was 74.39. The education level has negative effects on the probability of enter-
ing into the informal sector and one extra year of education reduces the probabil-
ity of engagement in the informal sector by 3%. Finally, a 1% increase in the wage 
gap decreases the probability of engagement in the informal sector by around 7%.
In order to consider the relationship between minimum wage and informality, we 
have introduced in the specification interactions between cohort dummies and the 
wage gap. Marginal effects of these interactions has been computed using the fol-
lowing equation7,
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The results are in Table 3 below.
Estimates in Table 3 bring to light an interesting issue. A rise of the wage gap 
reduces the benefits to work in the informal sector, but for individuals in the third 
cohort it increases the probability to enter into the informal sector. This result has 
been observed by Hernández and Pinzón (2006) at macro level and a possible
fails to correct the selection bias, but also raises a discussion about the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives. 
6
 We used 274,162 individuals in all cohorts to estimate the equation of selection.
7
 We acknowledge a referee for suggesting the use of a correct formula for marginal effects of inter-
actions. Ai and Norton (2003) and Karaca-Mandic, Norton and dowd (2012) show the procedure 
to be used for one interaction. We use delta method to compute standard errors.
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explanation is the presence of substitution effects due to the cost in the formal 
labor market. When the minimum real wage drops there is an increase of the labor 
demand in the formal sector and a reduction of the probability of joining informal-
ity. If the reduction in unemployment is greater than the growth in formal employ-
ment wages in the informal sector drop and the wage gap increases (Fiszbain, 
1992).8 In the period under consideration, the reduction of unemployment was of 
7%, employment increased by 0.2% and the minimum wages dropped as a per-
centage of the gNP (Rhenals, 2009) this is a possible explanation of the result.
TAbLE 3.
MARgINAL EFFEcTs FOR INTERAcTIONs
pool probit iV-probit
interaction bi std. err. bi std. err.
c1 * gap -0.2084071 0.0098895** -0.2288879 0.0240004**
c2 * gap -0.1255369 0.0072817 -0.1353392 0.0110986**
c3 * gap 0.0097549 0.0050638** 0.0135323 0.005305**
c4 * gap -0.0768808 0.0065253** -0.0773693 0.0065951**
c5 * gap -0.0664945 0.0065668** -0.0646899 0.0068185**
c6 * gap -0.06814 0.0071976** -0.0666043 0.0073797**
Note: * p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01.
source: Authors’ calculations using The National Housing survey (dANE-EcH).
ConClusions
The engagement of informal workers in the labor market is a topic that has been 
recently discussed in colombia. concerning the determinants of the engage-
ment in the informal sector there is only consensus on a couple of relevant issues. 
Firstly, the higher the educational level, the higher the incentives to engage in the 
informal sector, and, secondly, non-labor income has an inverse relationship with 
the probability to join informality.
On the other hand, the standard results of the WgM model could be moderate in 
a developing country because the effect of an increased minimum wage on labor 
8
 boeri and garibaldi (2009) show that the regulations in the labor market produce wage differ-
ences between sectors.
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participation depends on the proportion of workers by cohorts in both formal and 
informal sectors. Our estimates corroborate the negative effect of the education 
level on the decision to enter into the informal sector. Our results also show that 
the minimum wage levels have an impact on the distribution of wages among for-
mal and informal workers (Arango & Pachón, 2004; Maloney & Núñez, 2003; 
Lemos, 2007, 2009),9 and they generate incentives to join informality.
Therefore, we recommend that the political debate about the reduction or elimi-
nation of the minimum wage in colombia should incorporate an analysis of the 
current encouraging factors that have had an impact on the colombian labor mar-
ket. Among them, labor mobility between formal and informal sectors and its 
relationship with the labor force composition in both sectors is a relevant subject 
that deserves a more in-depth discussion in the design of advisable policies with 
respect to the reduction or elimination of the minimum wage in colombia. 
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